

Conceptual Dependency

Conceptual Dependency

- ◆ Developed by Schank, starting in 1968.
- ◆ Tried to get as far away from language as possible, embracing canonical form, proposing an interlingua.
- ◆ Borrowed
 - from Colby and Abelson, the terminology that sentences reflected *conceptualizations*, which combine *concepts*.
 - from case theory, the idea of cases, but assigned these to underlying *concepts* rather than to linguistic units (e.g., verbs).
 - from the dependency grammar of David Hayes, idea of *dependency*.

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Very Rough Idea


- ◆ Consider
Jan hit the cat.
- ◆ First, classify the situation as of type *Action*.
- ◆ Actions have *conceptual cases*, e.g., all actions require
 - Act (the particular type of action)
 - Actor (the responsible party)
 - Object (the thing acted upon)

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Notation

- ◆ Might have just represented example as
Action
Act: [apply a force]
Actor: Jan1
Object: Cat1
- ◆ Or using some graphic notation, e.g.:



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But Nooo...

- ◆ Introduced his own, rather curious notation:

Jan \leftrightarrow [apply a force] \leftarrow^a Cat

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Comments


- ◆ Conceptual cases for a given concept are *always obligatory*.
- ◆ No claim about what gets expressed in a sentence.
- ◆ Things like [apply a force] are placeholders for now.
 - Can't use things like "hit", since those are too close to a given language.

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In fact

- ◆ A more careful analysis might be



I.e., Jan applied a force to the cat by moving some object to come in contact with the cat.

(The new arrow denotes *instrumental case*.)

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
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Hitting, etc.

- ◆ Now consider

Jan kicked the cat.

A plausible representation is



I.e., we have *decomposed* "kick" into "hit with one's foot".


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Another Example


- ◆ Consider

Jan took the book from Pat.



- ◆ Now consider

Jan gave the book to Pat.




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Example (con't)

- ◆ How about

Pat received the book from Jan.



- ◆ Note that this is *exactly* the same as for

Jan gave the book to Pat.

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Comments

- ◆ CD is a *decompositional* approach.
 - The representation analyzes surface forms into an underlying structure, in an attempt to capture common meaning elements.
- ◆ The diagrams above are incomplete.
 - Time, modal info, etc., was provided for.
 - » But haphazardly. E.g., a "p" over a " \Leftrightarrow " indicates that the time was in the past.

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Ontology

- ◆ Situations were divided into several types:
 - Actions
 - States
 - State changes
 - Causals
- ◆ (There wasn't much of an attempt to classify objects.)

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States

- ◆ In general
Object \Leftrightarrow State-type(state-value)
- ◆ Example: The ball is red.
Ball \Leftrightarrow Color(Red)
- ◆ Example: Jan is 6 feet tall.
Jan \Leftrightarrow Height(6 feet)
- ◆ Example: Jan's height is 6 feet.
 - Exactly the same.

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More Interesting Example

- ◆ What about: "Jan is taller than Pat." ?
- ◆ In CD:
Jan \Leftrightarrow Height(X)
&
Pat \Leftrightarrow Height(Y)
&
X > Y

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Many States Viewed as Points on Scales

- ◆ Jan is angry.
Jan \Leftrightarrow Anger(5)
- ◆ Jan is furious.
Jan \Leftrightarrow Anger(7)
- ◆ Jan is livid.
Jan \Leftrightarrow Anger(10)
- ◆ Jan is irritated.
Jan \Leftrightarrow Anger(2)

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Scales

- ◆ There are supposed to be lots of scales.
 - The numbers themselves weren't meant to be taken seriously.
 - But that lots of different terms differ only in how they refer to scales was.
- ◆ Examples:
Jan is ill.
Jan \Leftrightarrow Health(-3)
Jan is dead.
Jan \Leftrightarrow Health(-10)
- ◆ An interesting question is what sort of semantic objects are there to describe locations on a scale?
 - E.g., modifiers like "very", "extremely" might have an interpretation as "toward an end of a scale".

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Example

- ◆ What is "Jan grew an inch."
- ◆ This is supposed to be a *state change*.
 - I.e., somewhat like an action, but with no responsible agent posited.
- ◆ Notation:

Jan \Leftrightarrow $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Height}(X+1") \\ \text{Height}(X) \end{array} \right.$

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Another State Change Example

- ◆ Jan died.


Jan \Leftrightarrow $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Health}(-10) \\ \text{Health}(>-10) \end{array} \right.$

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Example

- ◆ What about "Jan hurt Pat."
(assuming the physical interpretation.)
- ◆ Intuitively, this is "Jan did something to cause Pat to become hurt."
- ◆ So:




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Causals

- ◆ Now if we heard
Jan hurt Pat by hitting her.
we would have




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
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More Examples

- ◆ Jan killed Pat.



- ◆ Jan frightened Pat.




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One More

- ◆ Consider
Jan likes ice cream.
- ◆ Proposal:



Need to add some element of habitual, tendency...

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Types of Causals

- ◆ Several types of causals were distinguished, each with different constraints:

- Actions **result** in state changes:



- States **enable** (potential) actions:




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
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Types of Causals (con't)

- A mental state can be the **reason** for an action:



- Anything could **initiate** a mental state:



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Types of Causals (con't)

- ◆ There was a general "catch all" causal.
 - One situation and indirectly lead to another:



- ◆ Might be used in something like
The hurricane caused by depression.

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The Promissory Note

- ◆ We have decomposed lexical items into complexes of states, actions, state changes, and causals.
- ◆ We postulated some states, and some causals.
 - and state changes use the state vocabulary
- ◆ But what is the act vocabulary?
- ◆ E.g., "kick" is "hit with foot", and "hit" is "apply a force by moving", but what are "apply a force" and "move"?

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Claim: Primitives


- ◆ There are some things we can't decompose any further.
- ◆ These are *conceptual primitives*.
- ◆ Schank claimed
 - we always decompose complex concepts into primitives.

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Primitives: Example

- ◆ PROPEL: "apply a force".
- ◆ PTRANS: "physical transfer"
 - i.e., for moving an object from one location to another.
- ◆ We can render "Jan hit the cat" as follows:




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Another PTRANS Example

- ◆ Pat went to SF from Berkeley.




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
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Another Primitive: ATRANS

Jan gave the book to Pat.



Jan bought a book from Pat.



Pat sold Jan a book. ?
Exactly the same.

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Action Primitives

- Schank claimed that there were only a handful of primitives for *all* actions.
 - » Something like 11-14, depending on the version.

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A Set of CD Primitives

- ◆ General Physical acts
 - PTRANS: physical transfer.
 - » E.g., "send" might be PTRANS an object to a location; "go" was PTRANS oneself to a location; "walk", "swim", "fly", etc., added an instrument.
 - PROPEL: apply a force.

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CD Primitives (con't)

- ◆ Animate physical acts
 - MOVE: Move a body part. Generally occurs as an instrument.
 - » As, e.g., in analysis of verbs "walk" and "run".
 - INGEST: An animal moving something into its body.
 - » E.g., "eat" is INGESTing food through the mouth; "breathing" is INGESTing air into the lungs.
 - EXPEL: An animal moving a substance from its body to outside.
 - » E.g., "spit"
 - GRASP: Hold an object.
 - SPEAK: Make a sound.
 - » E.g., occurs in "talk"

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CD Primitives (con't)

- ◆ Mental acts
 - MTRANS: Mental transfer.
 - » E.g., "inform", "communicate", "threaten", "tell", "remember", "forget", and "learn" are analyzed using MTRANS.
 - CD postulates mental states primitives as well.
 - » MLOC: mental locations generally.
 - » CP ("conscious processor"): the place where an idea is when one is thinking about it
 - » IM ("intermediate memory")
 - » LTM ("long-term memory").
 - E.g.:
 - » (some) rememberings would be MTRANSs of a thought from one's LTM to one's CP;
 - » "tell" is MTRANSing by SPEAKing words.

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CD Primitives (con't)


- ◆ Mental acts (con't)
 - ATTEND: Direct a sense organ toward a percept. Usually occurs as an instrument.
 - E.g.,
 - » "listen" is glossed as MTRANSing by ATTENDING one's ear;
 - » "see" as MTRANSing (from one's eyes to one's CP) by ATTENDING one's eyes;
 - » "read" as MTRANSing by ATTENDING one's eyes to some written language.
 - ◆ MBUILD: Come to a conclusion.
 - E.g., "decide" and "solve" are analyzed in terms of MBUILD.

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Comment

- ◆ Recall case semantics postulated an *experiencer* case for (passive) mental events.
- ◆ In CD, these would just be objects of mental states.
- ◆ E.g., Jan in "Jan believes Pat went to NY" is just the person whose MLOC contains this proposition:



(The arrow is just the normal state arrow turned on its side.)

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CD Primitives (con't)

- ◆ Social acts:
 - ATRANS: Abstract transfer
 - Others?
 - » The lack of other social actions probably should be construed not as a denial of their existence, but of a lack of clear understanding of how to represent them.

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CD Pros

- ◆ Daring attempt to get away from words.
 - And so, affords at least the possibility of achieving canonical form and being an interlingua.
- ◆ Decomposition address problems in case theory by revealing underlying conceptual structure.
 - E.g., issues of "co-theme" (as in "Jan bought a book for \$5"), and of the cases for a verb like "frighten";
 - CD resolves by postulating relations between *concepts*, not between linguistic elements.
 - » E.g., "\$5" is simply the object of one of the underlying ATRANS components of buying.

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CD Pros (con't)

- ◆ Paraphrase recognition is now essentially trivial.
 - E.g.:
 - "Jan went to SF by BART"
 - "Jan took BART to SF"both have exactly the same representation.
- ◆ Also, some partial paraphrase would be captured.
 - E.g., the representations for "hit" and "kick" overlap.
- ◆ This is in contrast to semantic network (and more lexically-based) approaches, in which such commonalities must be addressed by inference rules.
- ◆ Lets us account for "false alarm" results.
 - I.e., CD is the thing you remember when you have forgotten the words.

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CD Pros (con't)

- ◆ Prospects for machine translation are improved.
 - Since representation is supposed to be an interlingua, MT is ostensibly just analysis and generation.
 - Recall that interlingua-based MT would require only a single analysis and generation program for each language, not a cross-product of language-to-language programs.
 - Of course, analysis and generation are going to be interesting here!

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CD Pros (con't)

- ◆ Inference might become more manageable.
- ◆ Idea was that a lot of inference would be dependent only on knowledge of particular primitives.
 - But there are only a few of these.
- ◆ E.g., for any ATRANS, we could infer
 - Prior to the ATRANS,
 - » the **donor** has the **object**
 - » And, at least normatively, the **actor** wanted the **recipient** to have the **object**
 - After the ATRANS, the **recipient** has the **object**.
- ◆ These would be in lieu of rules for each transfer-of-possession verb, i.e., buy, sell, give, take, donate.

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CD Pros (con't)

- ◆ It was hoped that the structure of the conceptual level might aid parsing by generating *predictions*.
- ◆ E.g., in understanding "Jan gave a book to Pat," when the analyzer gets to "book", it can
 - choice among possible conceptual structures based on which afford a place for this sort of thing, and thus choose (and partially instantiated) an ATRANS:

Jan ↔ ATRANS ←^o Book ← [] Jan

 - ◆ Now
 - there is a place for an animate entity (the **recipient** slot).
 - So we can put "Pat" in there when we see it.
 - ◆ So maybe one could conceptually/semantically (rather than syntactically or lexically) drive the parser.

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CD Pros (con't)

- ◆ Some early systems seemed promising.
 - Conceptual Analysis: I.e., mapping from English to CD.
 - » Riesbeck produced a number of such program, including ELI (English Language Interpreter).
 - Inference and Memory: Chuck Rieger build a system (MEMORY) that stored CD-represents of sentence and made inference from them.
 - Production: Neil Goldman wrote a program (Babel) that mapped CD-formulas into English.
- ◆ These systems were combined for demonstration purposed into the MARGIE system.
 - ran "paraphrase" and "inference" modes.

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Problems With CD: Incompleteness

- ◆ There was no language for dealing with quantification, scoping.
 - E.g., there is no way to say in CD that the actor of every action is animate.
- ◆ No specific treatment of objects, others
- ◆ No hierarchies
 - Everything is expanded into primitives, but there is no concept per se of "running", or "buying" or "buying at a supermarket"
 - This made it very difficult to deal with sentences like these:
 - Lynn went to the circus [to a restaurant].
 - Pat took the bus to the city.
 - Jan got in touch with Lynn.
 - What happened?
- ◆ Some cheating.
 - E.g., "run" was "walk quickly", which isn't exactly right.

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Problems With CD: Nature of Primitives

- ◆ There was a lot of debate whether there are such things are conceptual primitives.
- ◆ Some arguments were that
 - Primitives might be relative.
 - » E.g., MOVE to a physiologist is complex. (So primitives are atomic only in the sense that atoms are.)
 - Primitive could be made out of other primitives. E.g., PTRANS could be broken down into littler PTRANSes.
- ◆ Some object to the idea that concepts have definitions, much less that one can decompose them into primitives.

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Problems With CD: Justifying the Details

- ◆ How do we know we have the right analysis?
- ◆ There are some tests that can help.
- ◆ E.g., the "but test" helps to distinguish
 - logically necessary components of meaning
 - plausible inferences
 - non-sequiturs
- ◆ The test:
 - Negate the candidate support, conjoin it to proposition with "but".
 - If the resulting sentence is
 - » a contradiction, then it is logically necessary
 - » normal, then it is a plausible inference
 - » absurd, then it is a non-sequitur

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"But Test" Example

- ◆ Suppose the sentence is
Jan hit Lynn.
- ◆ Now consider
 - Jan hit Lynn but Lynn wasn't touched by anything.
 - » contradictory, so being touched is part of hitting.
 - Jan hit Lynn but Lynn wasn't hurt.
 - » normal, so being hurt is a plausible inference.
 - Jan hit Lynn but Lynn didn't go to SF by bus.
 - » silly, so this isn't either.

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Entailment and CD

- ◆ Note that CD didn't explicitly include the logical entailments as part of the meaning if they were entailments of the primitive act.
- ◆ E.g., "hit" entails "being touched", "give" entails "recipient having".
- ◆ But these were implicit in our knowledge.

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Problems With CD: Justifying the Details (con't)

- ◆ Do we have the right set of primitives?
- ◆ E.g., an alternative analysis of actions (advocated by Rumelhart, Lindsay and Norman) is "do cause state-change".
 - with no action primitives, but just states, which we have to postulate anyway.
- ◆ There were appeals to general principles (canonical form, aiding inference)
 - and CD changed a lot based on such arguments
 - but a convincing methodology never arrived.

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Problems With CD: Proliferation of Non-Primitives

- ◆ Lots of non-action primitives in any analysis.
- ◆ I.e., states, objects, motions, etc. didn't seem to boil down to a very small number of primitives.
- ◆ So the reduction achieved in actions, even if you buy it, wouldn't be across the board.

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Problems With CD: Need for Higher Level Concepts for Inference

- ◆ CD emphasized the importance of action primitives for inference.
- ◆ However, knowledge needed is not necessarily organized at this level.
- ◆ E.g, consider
 - "Jan bought a book"
 - › inf: at the store
 - "Jan kissed Lynn"
 - › inf: Jan likes Lynn
 - "Jan got a gun"
 - › inf: to threaten or shoot someone
 - "Bush said social security will run out of money in 2017."
 - › inf: believe based on person, etc.

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Problems With CD: Semantic Parsing Didn't Pan Out

- ◆ Looking for appropriate slots to fill wasn't generally good enough.
 - E.g., consider "Jan learned Pat left town."
 - "learned" is glossed (at least here) as an MTRANS from an unspecified actor.
 - › When an analyzer sees "Pat", it will be tempted to make it the actor by slot-fitting, which is just wrong.
- ◆ As we suggested previously, lots of linguistic details are very lexically-dependent.
 - Jan forced Pat to leave.
 - Jan made Pat leave.
 - It is likely that Bush will remain in office.
 - It is probable that Bush will remain in office.
 - Bush is likely to remain in office.
 - *Bush is probable to remain in office.

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A Possible Resolution


- ◆ Propose a hierarchy of action and other event types.
 - Make these as language-neutral as possible.
 - Inheritance captures similarities between concepts.
 - I.e., CD primitives simply become fairly high (but otherwise undistinguished) elements of the hierarchy.
- ◆ E.g., have nodes denoting only the possession senses of the English words "Give", "Take", etc.
 - These might be subtypes of an ATRANS node.
- ◆ Decomposition would be "virtual".
- ◆ Is it still an interlingua?
 - Exact concepts in our network would be a function of particular languages.
 - But only to the degree that the languages really have different underlying cognitive structures.
 - Upon generation, a concept that didn't occur in another language would just be generated by a circumlocution. E.g., "He caused a transfer of possession unto himself."

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Example: CD In A Semantic Network

- ◆ Trying to combine CD and semantic networks:



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Example, Logically

- $\forall e \text{ Ind}(e, \text{Action}) \rightarrow \exists a, o \text{ Actor}(a, e) \wedge \text{Object}(o, e)$
- $\forall e, a \text{ Actor}(a, e) \rightarrow \text{Animate}(a)$
- $\forall e, o \text{ Object}(o, e) \rightarrow \text{Phys-obj}(o)$
- ...
- $\forall e \text{ Ind}(e, \text{Atrans}) \rightarrow \text{Ind}(e, \text{Action}) \wedge$
 $\exists d, r \text{ Donor}(d, e) \wedge \text{Recipient}(r, e)$
- $\forall e, d \text{ Donor}(d, e) \rightarrow \text{Animate}(d)$
- $\forall e, r \text{ Recipient}(r, e) \rightarrow \text{Animate}(r)$
- ...
- $\forall e \text{ Ind}(e, \text{Give}) \rightarrow \text{Ind}(e, \text{Atrans}) \wedge \exists g \text{ Giver}(g, e)$
- $\forall e, g \text{ Giver}(g, e) \rightarrow \text{Actor}(g, e) \wedge \text{Donor}(g, e)$

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Adding Content

◆ Some related facts:

- $\forall s \text{ Ind}(s, \text{Possession}) \rightarrow \text{Ind}(s, \text{State})$
 $\wedge \exists p, n, \text{Possessor}(p, s) \wedge \text{Possessed}(n, s)$
- $\forall s, p \text{ Possessor}(p, s) \rightarrow \text{Animate}(p)$
- ...

◆ Now use your favorite way to express change:

- $\forall e \text{ Ind}(e, \text{Atrans}) \rightarrow$
 $\wedge \exists d, r, o, p_1, p_2$
 $\text{Donor}(d, e) \wedge \text{Recipient}(r, e) \wedge \text{Object}(o, e) \wedge$
 $\text{Ind}(p_1, \text{Possession}) \wedge \text{Possessor}(d, p_1) \wedge \text{Possessed}(o, p_1) \wedge$
 $\text{Meet}(\text{End}(p_1), \text{Start}(e)) \wedge$
 $\text{Ind}(p_2, \text{Possession}) \wedge \text{Possessor}(r, p_2) \wedge \text{Possessed}(o, p_2) \wedge$
 $\text{Meet}(\text{End}(e), \text{Start}(p_2))$

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Individual Facts and Inferences

◆ So "Jan gave Pat a book" becomes

$\text{Ind}(G1, \text{Give}) \wedge \text{Giver}(\text{Jan1}, G1) \wedge \text{Recipient}(\text{Pat1}, G1) \wedge$
 $\text{Object}(\text{Book1}, G1)$

...

◆ By (logical) inference


$\text{Ind}(P1, \text{Possession}) \wedge \text{Possessor}(\text{Jan1}, P1) \wedge$
 $\text{Possessed}(\text{Book1}, P1) \wedge \text{Meet}(\text{End}(P1), \text{Start}(G1)) \wedge$
 $\text{Ind}(P2, \text{Possession}) \wedge \text{Possessor}(\text{Pat1}, P2) \wedge$
 $\text{Possessed}(\text{Book1}, P2) \wedge \text{Meet}(\text{End}(G1), \text{Start}(P2))$

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Using More Sophisticated Semantic Networks

◆ Same example with "reified" roles:



Unlabeled lines are "Has-Role"
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This Has Logical Form, Too

- | | |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Has-Role(Action, Actor) | Isa(Give, Atrans) |
| Has-Role(Action, Object) | Has-Role(Give, Giver) |
| Value(Actor, Animate) | Isa(Giver, Atrans-actor) |
| Value(Object, Phys-obj) | Isa(Giver, Donor) |
| | Has-Role(Give, Givee) |
| Isa(Atrans, Action) | Isa(Givee, Recipient) |
| Has-Role(Atrans, Atrans-actor) | Has-Role(Give, Given) |
| Isa(Atrans-actor, Actor) | Isa(Given, Atrans-object) |
| Has-Role(Atrans, Donor) | |
| Value(Atrans-actor, Animate) | |
| Has-Role(Atrans, Recipient) | |
| Value(Recipient, Animate) | |
| Has-Role(Atrans, Atrans-object) | |
| Isa(Atrans-object, Object) | |

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About These Predicates

- $\forall i, c_1, c_2 \text{ Isa}(c_1, c_2) \rightarrow (\text{Ind}(i, c_1) \rightarrow \text{Ind}(i, c_2))$
- $\forall i, r, c \text{ Value}(r, c) \rightarrow (\text{Filler}(r, i) \rightarrow \text{Ind}(i, c))$
- $\forall i, r, c \text{ Has-Role}(c, r) \rightarrow$
 $(\text{Ind}(i, c) \rightarrow \exists ir \text{ Has-IRole}(i, ir) \wedge \text{Ind}(ir, r))$

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Individual Facts and Inferences

- ◆ So "Jan gave Pat a book" becomes (the somewhat more complicated):

$\text{Ind}(G1, \text{Give}) \wedge$
 $\text{Has-IRole}(G1, \text{Giver1}) \wedge \text{Filler}(\text{Giver1}, \text{Jan1})$
 $\text{Has-IRole}(G1, \text{Giver1}) \wedge \text{Filler}(\text{Giver1}, \text{Pat1})$
 $\text{Has-IRole}(G1, \text{Giver1}) \wedge \text{Filler}(\text{Giver1}, \text{Book1})$
...

- ◆ Inference similar

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Assignment

- ◆ Work with a logical-semantic network representation language.

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